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Metaphor, Marx, Agamben and International Law: The Jamaican Quashee/
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Abstract
In the Grundrisse Karl Marx wrote of how what ‘was the living worker's activity becomes the activity of the
machine’ and that ‘the appropriation of labor by capital confronts the worker in a coarsely sensuous form;
capital absorbs labor into itself – “as though its body were by love possessed”’. Marx drew this
metaphorical quotation from Goethe’s Faust literarily describing a poisoned swollen-bellied dying rat. The
line mattered enough to Marx (and Engels) to be present too in the first volume of Capital. What work this
metaphorization does and how it indirectly relates to Giorgio Agamben’s enigmatic notion of inoperativity
(also translated as inactivity, or inoperativeness and referencing human potential as incorporating both
the capacity to do and the capacity not to do) is the central task of this paper. The paper argues that the
abstracted notion of the emancipated slave who is not inclined to work for money but only works as is
necessary was proffered by Marx, and is also proffered by Agamben, as an exemplary metaphorical
model for general emancipation. If this is true, it would place the material conditions necessary for both
Marx’s and Agamben’s theorisations in the concrete context of the Jamaican Quashees of the 19th
Century Caribbean, and neither in classical antiquity (a fact relevant to the charge, unfounded or not, of
Agamben’s Eurocentrism), nor in biblical exegesis (a fact relevant to the charge, unfounded or not, of
Agamben’s mysticism).
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Metaphor, Marx, Agamben and
International Law: The Jamaican Quashee/
Quasheeba, the Necessity of Labour, and
the Subjectivity of Emancipated Slaves
Edwin Bikundo1
1 Introduction
Laziness is taboo, yet this paper is a manifesto for the lazy and I its
author count myself as one of that otherwise nondescript rabble.
Laziness is not something to be proud of or to proclaim publicly
without embarrassment. ‘Otiose’, a word that originally meant leisure,
has come to mean of no practical benefit, as if leisure is not practically
beneficial as such. Yet like a taboo or a ghost, its non-existence still
haunts us, and this essay seeks to trace its wilful outline by means of
certain similarities in shape and form or isomorphisms that relate
otherwise distinct phenomena. Outlining that isomorphism is akin to
drawing the chalk outline of a body in a murder scene without the
body – only by the signature of that body.
The body of which I speak is the figure—the fantasy or the
metaphor—of the emancipated slave (even though actual human beings
are the concrete historical material referent of this metaphor) who would
resolutely not work beyond what was necessary. Metaphors are not
strange to law. The ubiquitous social contract and its synonyms, the veil
of ignorance, the original position, (see e.g., Rawls 1971: 136, Nozick

58

Law Text Culture Vol 26 2022

Metaphor, Marx, Agamben and International Law: The Jamaican
Quashee/Quasheeba, the Necessity of Labour, and the Subjectivity
of Emancipated Slaves

1974: 42), etc. endure. As we shall see below the point is that Marx
uses the metaphor of the slave as the basis of his analysis of capitalism.
And he seizes on the story of the Quashee to prove what is ideological
in the metaphor. What needs pointing out is that if anyone knows the
limits of that metaphor it is the freed slaves themselves. Their stand and
what happened to them – not in fiction but in the real world of 19th C
Jamaica – shows us what is stake in the metaphorical and ideological
contours of capitalism. And it also shows us the possibility of resistance,
of refusing the duty to work and reclaiming the dream of laziness once
and for all. But this will require us to move beyond mere metaphor to
a more concrete historical analysis of a basic and fundamental feature
of international law and jurisprudence.
2 Pastoral Scenes: Marx and Faust and Agamben
No less as astute a reader of Agamben than Jessica Whyte has written
that ‘Marx remains a subterranean influence on Agamben’s thought’
(Whyte 2017: 263). Whyte goes on to identify two types of readers of
Marx, ‘Rousseauists’ who valorise an ‘actually existing’ working class,
and those readers of Marx, like GM Tamás, who see “the ‘Faustiandemonic’ expropriative power of capital as the condition of possibility
of a class ‘with nothing to lose but its chains’” (Whyte 2017: 229). For
Tamás,
Marx is the poet of that Faustian demonism: only capitalism reveals
the social, and the final unmasking, the final apocalypse, the final
revelation can be reached by wading through the murk of estrangement
which, seen historically, is unique in its energy, in its diabolical force.’
(Tamás 2005: 230)

Tamás explains that Karl Marx and Marxism aimed at the abolition of
the proletariat, as opposed to ‘the apotheosis and triumphant survival
of the proletariat’ (Tamás 2005: 229). This is why ‘Rousseauian’ EP
Thompson’s masterpiece, The Making of the English Working Class ‘had
to ignore the Faustian-demonic encomium of capitalism inherent in
Marx, and so he had to oppose ‘critical theory’, and then theory tout
court’ (Tamás 2005: 229).
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Whyte notes that although ‘Hannah Arendt prepared manuscripts
on Marx’s thought, which exerted a strong influence on Agamben’
(Whyte 2017: 267), nonetheless ‘Agamben is closer to Marx than
to Arendt’ (Whyte 2017: 268). To illustrate: ‘[t]he exclusion of ‘necessity’, or the maintenance of biological life, from the polis is, in
his view, the abandonment that structures all subsequent Western
politics, rendering it biopolitical from its inception. And like Marx,
Agamben envisages a world, which he tends to locate at the end
of history, in which humanity will be freed from the compulsion
to labour’ (Whyte 2017: 268). Whyte notes how strange it was that
Arendt does not mention the role of the slave in Athenian society
whereas in The Use of Bodies Agamben clearly describes the special
status of slaves who were both excluded and included in humanity
in the sense that a free man implies a slave as a necessary condition
of its possibility (Agamben 2015: 20).
Whyte points out that ‘Marx’s examples of a worker who ceases to
be a worker, by stealing or inheriting money, suggest a new freedom
not merely from labour itself, but from the compulsion to sell one’s
labour power in order to put it to work’ (Whyte 2017: 266). So too for
Agamben—and this is the key to their connection to the metaphor of
slavery and its opposite, the otiose—’inoperativity cannot simply be
equated with the absence of work’ (Whyte 2017: 267). Whyte adds:
Just like the abolition of labour that Marx and Engels wrote of,
Agamben’s inoperativity is not simply an idleness but a human activity
freed of instrumentality and a necessary relation to an end. What
would such an activity look like? Perhaps, if we were to envisage it in
a bucolic key, we would ‘hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon,
rear cattle in the evening, criticize after dinner’ - all ‘without ever
becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic’(Whyte 2017: 263
from Marx and Engels 1976: 5).

Whyte’s choice of adjective, bucolic, to invoke Marx’s utopia in this
context (together with its cognates, Edenic, heavenly, pastoral - as in
pastoral scenes, paradisiacal, idyllic, Arcadian, utopian, etc), recalls the
walled garden of Eden especially in its distinction from the wilderness
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of Eden itself. In that telling, humans were originally born in an
already divinely cultivated garden and were then by divine judgment
cast out into the wilderness as opposed to being born in the wilderness
and then had to cultivate a garden through their own efforts. In
this narrative what marks us as demonstrably living human beings
(the imperative need for life’s necessities like food, clothing, shelter,
medicine) is re-read and re-presented as a demonic curse. Work
specifically is only necessary through the operations of the law and it is
all mostly women’s fault. Surely, it is not unreasonable to speculate that
the biblical Eve who entered into a deal with the devil in exchange for
knowledge was Faust’s prototype.
Marx’s utopia is therefore both Faustian and Edenic in origin.
Although he was not particularly enamoured of rights as propounded
by the bourgeoisie, he nonetheless championed a species of freedom in
touting that everyone should have life’s necessities automatically availed
to them by society in order for them to achieve their potential (Ross
2019: 119-120). The contemporary bifurcation of rights into (more or
less right wing) civil and political rights enshrined in the International
Covenant for Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) on the one hand, and
(more or less left wing) economic social and cultural rights enshrined
in the International Covenant for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(IESCR) on the other, ensured that there could be no single human
rights covenant as was envisaged in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights (UDHR). More than that, it ensured that paid work remains
what it always was: a continuing form of slavery. This is probably why
Agamben repeatedly proffers Bartleby’s signature phrase “I prefer not
to” via repeated engagement with Aristotle as a way of paralysing the
apparatuses of power in western liberal societies without breaking
the law (Agamben 1993: 34, Agamben 1995: 65, Agamben 1998: 48,
Agamben 1999: 177, Agamben 2000: 23).
This is not a mere petty philosophical, political or ideological
squabble either. It remains a monument to a metaphysical split between
comedy and tragedy: between the status of a legal person that is able
to bear rights and duties (as in civil and political rights); and the
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condition of a human being whose life requires the constant provision
of necessities (as in economic social and cultural rights). Crucially, only
one figure, the slave, can readily cross that threshold between status
and condition, as the first Article of the Slavery Convention of 1926
shows us: ‘the status or condition of a person over whom any or all of
the powers attaching to the right of ownership are exercised’.

Even in early discussions of the ICCPR’s Article 8 outlawing slavery
‘it was pointed out that slavery, which implied the destruction of the
juridical personality, was a relatively limited and technical notion’
(Bossuyt 1987: 167). This convenient juridical evisceration of the
concept directly invokes and relates to Article 16 which states ‘Everyone
has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law’.
Hannah Arendt would have described this as the right to have rights
(Arendt 1949, Michelman 1996: 200). The evolution of that article is
intriguing. At the first session of the drafting committee, it read as:
‘No person shall be restricted in the personal exercise of his civil rights
or deprived of judicial personality’. It then shifted to ‘No person shall
be restricted in the personal exercise of his civil rights or deprived of
juridical personality’ and on to ‘No person shall be deprived of his
juridical personality’, then to ‘No one shall be deprived of his juridical
personality’ (Bossuyt 1987: 335), before settling into the current form
of words that preferred ‘recognition’ over ‘deprivation’ of personality.
Article 16 left intact the proposition that law can both deprive and
recognise personality and therefore confer or withhold the capacity
to enjoy rights as such. The basis of the final draft was article 6 of the
UDHR which (unlike the ICCPR and the ICESCR) was “understood
to apply to human beings, not to ‘juridical persons’” (Bossuyt 1987:
336). This is why ‘[t]here was general agreement that article 16 was
intended to ensure that every person would be a subject, and not an
object, of the law’ (Bossuyt 1987: 336).

In opposing the juridical protection of economic, social and cultural
rights the delegate of the United Kingdom expressed the view that
‘the world needed free men and not well-fed slaves’; consequently
‘economic and social rights and social security rested primarily on
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the affirmation of freedom of speech and the right to association’
(Schabas 2013: 1318). This expressed view and attitude that granting
legal protection of civil and political rights would somehow lead as
a matter of fact to the enjoyment of economic, social, and cultural
rights has held sway to the present day and profoundly influences
the development of international criminal law, international human
rights law, and international humanitarian law. No wonder that in
her appraisal of Agamben and Arendt, Sara Maria Sorentino argues
that the paradigmatic use of the slave ‘infects thought, deranges time,
delineates death, demarcates human-ness, and disavows its violence’
(2019: 656). The figure of the slave has become the lazy scapegoat of
the modern world, the opposite of liberal freedom, the opposite of the
capitalist west and all it stands for, the opposite of its ‘civil and political
rights’—and thus as the very opposite of what Marx had intended us
to see, metaphorically but endemically in our own practices of thought
word and deed.
While slavery, servitude and forced or compulsory labour are
prohibited under article 8 of the ICCPR as a negative right, the positive
expression of the right to work is recognised elsewhere. Article 6 of the
ICESCR includes the right of everyone to earn a living by work which
is freely chosen or accepted, Article 7 provides everyone the right to
enjoy just and favourable working conditions, and Article 8 provides
for safe and healthy working conditions (Schmid 2015). Slavery is
abolished from paid human labour and removed to the status of human
chattel-hood for which there is no or at least no longer any legal excuse.
In terms of human rights law that definition has been interpreted as we
saw above in a way that favours civil and political rights over economic
social and cultural rights (Schmid 2015). Because Agamben’s work has
shown the unbridgeable gulf between the UDHR on the one hand and
the ICCPR and ICESCR is the self-same gulf between the human and
the person at the heart of contemporary western legal anthropogenesis,
then the more pressing task is to either paper over the gap in the name
of business as usual or, on the contrary, to sever or jam that relationship
in search of a different legal anthropogenesis based upon freedom as
opposed to liberty.
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Simone Bignall suggests that although ‘Agamben’s Continental
Philosophy shows a redemptive capacity that may release (aspects of)
European thought from its long complicity with imperialism’… ‘it
remains unclear whether Agamben betrays the redemptive potential of
his philosophy when his own conceptual language remains contained
by an insular Westernity’ (Bignall 2014: 46). Magnus Fiskesjö, in a less
charitable reading, sees Agamben as either complicitly or unwittingly (it
is not clear which) participating in the disavowal of the world historical
Haitian antislavery revolution (Fiskesjö 2012). This will shortly return
us to the question of whether the concept of slavery remains in Marx and
Agamben a mere metaphorical flourish or whether there is something in
the historical record which might illuminate it. Given that Agamben
is bent upon unveiling of the mysteries of the West’s politics and law,
eurocentrism might be read more as a descriptor than an accusation.
Nonetheless, it cannot hurt to investigate the point further.

The primary distinction in Roman Law was that between slaves
and freemen (Buckland 2010: 735). Importantly ‘in Roman legal
discourse, the term homo, when used in isolation, meant simply “slave or
servant”’(Heller-Roazen 2009: 148) Roberto Esposito makes the point
that the term ‘person’ not only separates ‘servi [slaves] and liberi [free
men]’ but also further distinguishes, amongst liberi, ‘between ingenui
[freemen born free] and liberti [those manumitted from legal slavery]’
(2012: 22). Writing in the early eighteenth century Anton Wilhelm
Amo, the first African-born person to attend, to graduate from, or to
teach at a European university, relied on the Justinian Code to mount
the argument that Africans, whose Kings had pledged allegiance to
the Roman emperor, were consequently vassals of Rome (Abraham
1964: 60-81 and Abraham 2006: 191-1999). This allegiance was
constantly renewed through the issue of imperial patents including
by Justinian himself (Abraham 2006: 69). Furthermore, Christian
emperors, he argued, were precluded from enslaving their fellow
Christians (Abraham 1964: 70). It is only after mounting these legal and
theological arguments that Amo turns to the violations of elementary
principles of humanity as a third justification for the criminality of
slavery (Abraham 1964: 70).
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The perspicacious revelation of Amo’s work was that the concept of
humanity was impoverished - deficient even – as a legal concept. This is
clearly illustrated in the human right to recognition as a person, as we
saw above. That problematic gulf between the person and the human
has lost none of its contemporary relevance. In focussing on liberty and hence on the not-slave - we would still indelibly base our liberal
conceptions of rights in the abstract not on the notion of a free human
being that was born free (the ingenui) in Esposito’s taxonomy but on the
figure of the liberti - a freed human being that was once enslaved but
no longer is. It is worth recalling what Agamben says: ‘What is called
“face”- writes Cicero – cannot exist in any animal except in man” and
the Greeks defined the slave, who is not master of himself, aproposon,
literally “without face”.” (Agamben 2021). Tellingly Agamben notes
too that ‘Persona originally means “mask” and it is through the mask
that the individual acquires a role and a social identity’ (Agamben 2011:
46). The basis of all rights for everyone that enjoys them is projected
onto an artificial legal personality rather than being grounded in any
actual concrete material human life. As the subject of rights, we are as
faceless and as abstract as the slave against whom our ‘freedoms’ are
pitted, materially, historically and legally. Did any of the actual slaves
that litter the pages of human history themselves find a way out of this
universal Faustian bargain—giving up our humanity in exchange for
legally enforceable rights as persons? This is the task of the following
section of this essay. What after all does Agamben’s ‘inoperativity’ or
Marx’s utopia stand for if not a plea for human dignity from which has
been stripped—pace Arendt—not just our right but our duty to work.
Unworkers of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your chains!
3 Quashee or the Quashees? Slavery and Freedom Beyond
Metaphor
Marx’s Grundrisse contextualises so-called indolence in freed slaves.
Marx himself credits: ‘The Times of November 1857 [which] contains
an utterly delightful cry of outrage on the part of a West-Indian
plantation owner’ penned by an anonymous ‘Expertus’:
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The Quashees (the free blacks of Jamaica) content themselves with
producing only what is strictly necessary for their own consumption,
and, alongside this ‘ use value ‘, regard loafing (indulgence and
idleness) as the real luxury good ; how they do not care a damn for
the sugar and the fixed capital invested in the plantations, but rather
observe the planters’ impending bankruptcy with an ironic grin of
malicious pleasure, and even exploit their acquired Christianity as an
embellishment for this mood of malicious glee and indolence. 39 They
have ceased to be slaves, but not in order to become wage labourers, but,
instead, self-sustaining peasants working for their own consumption.
(Marx 1973).

Whereas Marx says ‘the Quashees’, Expertus says Quashee without
the definite article. treating it as a generic name for the freed slaves.
The Ghanaian Quashee or Quasie, or Kwesi, or Kwasi, or Akwesi, etc.
for males along with the feminine Quasheeba, Quasheba, Kwasiba,
etc. originally referred to a child, born on a Sunday (DeCamp 1967).
Appropriately so, as Agamben reminds us that redemption is not work
but is rather akin to the cessation of activity during the sabbath or
while taking a sabbatical (Agamben 2011). This is also what makes
us able to work in the first place whereas after the real practice of real
slaves (as opposed to metaphorical ones) shows how much they value
not work or money but idleness. This is the essence of their freedom
– not to be paid but to LIVE without work. The Quashees show both
the possibility of resistance to the capitalist mode of production – and
just what a risk true freedom poses for it. The freed slave undermines
the whole motivational assumptions behind capitalism. And it is the
passage from metaphor to the material reality of slavery and freedom
that lights the path. Simon Choat, in his Reader’s Guide to the Grundrisse,
would probably concur given his critique of the ‘crudely materialist,
unable to recognize that the qualities that they attribute to machines in
themselves – whether their capacity to emancipate or enslave – are not
the natural properties of machines but result from the social relations
within which machines are put to use’ (Choat 2016: 165). The question
whether mechanization is a mode of freedom or just another mode of
slavery is at its clearest in the freed slave who would no longer use,
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nor allow another to put to use (even for money), their body beyond
what was necessary to sustain them. A difficult model for the rest of
us to live up to. Just as the freed slave or Quashee illuminates, in their
shift from metaphor to materiality, the possibilities of resistance, so in
the language of the machine ‘by love possessed’, so-called economic
freedom reveals itself as nothing but a ‘poisoned swollen-bellied rat.’
4 Conclusion
This article begun by bringing together the overlapping thoughts of
Marx, Goethe and Agamben in a meaningful way to examine the
praxis of the freed slaves in Jamaica and the law’s violent response.
What other figure than the taboo figure of the slave concretely and
materially ticks such sundry Agambenian boxes as crossing the human/
animal, and slave/free citizen, and instrument/actor divides, is virtually
reduced to walking death, is denied both a face and a mask, discloses
how validity is granted to juridical acts which would otherwise be a
nullity, plays with roles for whose canonical role they have no respect,
and deactivates legal relations while rendering itself inoperable, all the
while combining poiesis and praxis in a life inseparable from its form?
The Agambenian figure par excellence is none other than the Quashee/
Quasheeba, a figure in which theory turns to praxis, and metaphor
comes to life. Metaphor is never enough. We must not just imagine
freedom but live it. Ironically enough their example, suffering, and
sacrifice indicate that it takes a lot of time, work, and effort to be lazy in
contemporary society. Let us all together now, in unison with Quashee
and Quasheeba, see through, see off and bid adieu to the implied duty
to work. We need no longer consent to swap our humanity for legal
personality.
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